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Article 7

I AM PUBLIUS, AND I APPROVE THIS MESSAGE:
THE BAFFLING AND CONFLICTED STATE OF
ANONYMOUS PAMPHLETEERING
POST-MCCONNELL
Richard M. Cardillo*
INTRODUCTION

"Reluctant, without clearer guidance from the Court, to interfere
with state experimentation in the baffling and conflicted field of
campaign finance law without guidance from authoritative precedent, we hold that the Indiana statute is constitutional."'
Hardly the most confident manner in which to end an opinion,
this quote is nonetheless the last line of the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Majors v. Abell (hereinafter Majors I!), a case concerning the constitutionality of Indiana Code section 3-9-3-2.5. Section 3-9-3-2.5 requires that political advertising that "expressly advocat[es] the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate" contain "a disclaimer that appears and is presented in a clear and conspicuous manner to give the reader or observer adequate notice of the identity of
persons who paid for . .. the communication." 2 The statute has a
limited exception for those distributing less than 100 pieces of "mail"
that are "substantially similar," 3 but otherwise effectively requires anyone creating or distributing materials advocating the election or defeat of a political candidate to identify himself or herself on the face
of the material.
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006; B.B.A., College of
William & Mary, 1999. I would like to thank Professor Richard W. Garnett for his
advice and encouragement, the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
efforts on behalf of this Note and my family for its endless support. I would also like
to thank my sister Sarah Reichenbecher for her editorial suggestions and Katie Triska
and Graham Wiemer for their inspiration and friendship.
1 Majors v. Abell (Majors II), 361 F.3d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.).
2 Id. at 350 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-9-3-2.5(b), (d) (Michie Supp. 2002)).
3 IND. CODE ANN. § 3-9-3-2.5(a) (9) (Michie Supp. 2002).
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Four Supreme Court cases have held or strongly implied that the
4
right to speak anonymously is protected by the First Amendment.
When a law burdens core political speech, the courts will apply an
exacting scrutiny5 standard and uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest. 6 In applying this
exacting scrutiny test, the Seventh Circuit, like many courts before it,
weighed the individual's right to anonymous political speech against
the state's interest in having an informed electorate and a corruptionfree electoral process. While ultimately siding with the state of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit was nonetheless forced to acknowledge the
state of confusion surrounding recent campaign finance legislation
and its impact on anonymous political speech. Although he joined
with his colleagues' decision, Judge Easterbrook was so unsure of the
7
wisdom of this judgment that he filed an opinion dubitante.
Much of this confusion stems from the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in McConnell v. FEC,8 where it decided, inter alia, on the constitutionality of a reporting requirement of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Act and
hereinafter BCRA). This specific provision of BCRA required individuals to report their identity to the Federal Election Commission
(FEC) if they spent more than $10,000 to produce "electioneering
communications" or donated $1000 to an organization that produced
such communications. 9 The Supreme Court found that this provision
was constitutional on the grounds that it served "important state interests ... [in] providing the electorate with information, deterring ac-

tual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering
the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering
restrictions.' 10
4

See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S.

150, 166-67 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 199-200
(1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 80 (1960).
5 The term "exacting scrutiny" was used by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 44 (1976) (per curiam), and in many subsequent cases dealing with government
"limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression." Id. at 45. It is
similar to the Court's traditional "strict scrutiny" standard.
6

McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.

7 "The term dubitante was usually placed in a law report next to a judge's name,
indicating that the judge doubted a legal point but was unwilling to state that it was
wrong." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 537 (8th ed. 2004).
8

540 U.S. 93 (2003).

9

2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 2002).

10

McConnell 540 U.S. at 196.
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Noting the similarity between the "disclaimer" requirement in the
Indiana statute and the disclosure requirement of BCRA, the Seventh
Circuit delayed its decision until the Supreme Court had delivered the
McConnell decision.1 1 Although it expressed a multitude of reservations, most notably the considerable loss of freedom of speech and
the press inherent in such a requirement, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless acknowledged that the Supreme Court had "crossed that Rubicon in McConnell"12 and saw no choice but to follow suit. One issue
that remains after McConnell is to what extent anonymous political
literature is protected in light of recent campaign finance reform legislation and specifically whether there remains a distinction between
statutes that require the "disclaimer" of information on the source of
the material as opposed to "disclosure" to a public agency.
Anonymous political writing was enormously influential in the nation's early history for many of the same reasons that it remains vital
today-it encourages the writer to express his ideas without fear of
retaliation and with the assurance that the ideas will be judged free of
source bias and thus on their merit alone. In a series of cases, the
Supreme Court identified anonymous political speech, particularly
anonymous pamphleteering, as being firmly protected by the First
Amendment. However, anonymous political speech faces much of
the same criticism in the twenty-first century that it did in the eighteenth century. 13 The lack of accountability created by anonymity sets
the table for potential corruption and abuse of the electoral process. 14
Now that the Supreme Court has again approved disclosure requirements for political "electioneering" communications, it is unclear
what protections remain for anonymous political speech at the local
and state levels.
In this Note, I will address the distinction between disclosure and
disclaimer requirements from a First Amendment standpoint. I will
also address some of the practical considerations that demand that
such a distinction be drawn. Part I will introduce the current state of
confusion surrounding disclosure laws post-McConnell. Part II will give
a brief history of the development of a constitutional right to anonymous political speech. Part III will discuss McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, in which the Supreme Court established the right to anonymous pamphleteering. Part IV will discuss the impact of campaign
11

Majors II, 361 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2004).

12
13

Id. at 355.
See Jonathan Turley, RegisteringPublius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity, 2002 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 57, 60.
14 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) ("The right
to remain anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct.").
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finance reform on that constitutional right and in Part V, I will explore the Majors II/Heller circuit split in greater detail. Part VI will
examine the difference between disclosure to a government agency
and requirements that a source identify itself on the face of the material, and whether such a distinction should continue to be a legally
established principle.
I.

DISCLOSURE VS. DISCLAIMER: DOES THE DISTINCTION REMAIN
POST-MCCONNELL?

But what must give us considerable pause, in light of the distinction
the Supreme Court has drawn between "disclosure" (reporting
one's identity to a public agency) and "disclaimer" (placing that
identity in the ad itself), is the fact that the Indiana statute requires
15
the latter and not merely the former.
Judge Richard Posner
The majority in McConnell emphasized that the disclosure to the
agency did not include the content of the advertisement. In Indiana the disclosure is affixed to the speech; the association is unavoidable; does this make a difference? My colleagues think not; I
16
am not so sure.
Judge Frank Easterbook
Is there a difference between requiring the distributor of political
material to disclose their identity ("disclosure") to a central government agency (such as the FEC) and revealing their identification on
the source of the material ("disclaimer" 17 )? As campaign finance reform legislation collides headfirst with the constitutional right to
anonymous political speech, courts are asking this very question. To
some, the difference may be minimal. Requiring a group or individual to state its identity on the face of political material is likely to be
much less of an economic, physical and bureaucratic burden than
having to report the same information to a centralized government
agency. On the other hand, there is a body of legal precedent in support of such a distinction, in addition to some very practical
considerations.

15 Majors II, 361 F.3d at 354.
16 Id. at 357 (Easterbrook, J., dubitante) (citations omitted).
17 As Judge Posner points out, "disclaimer" is actually a misnomer. The proper
word is disclosure, but that word has been appropriated to describe a requirement to
report one's identity to a central authority. Id. at 350. For the purposes of this Note,
I will continue to use the term "disclaimer" consistent with this meaning.
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The First Amendment states "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech." 8 This does not mean, however,
that the government can place no restrictions on speech. As often
discussed, the First Amendment does not allow a person to falsely
shout "fire" in a crowded theater without suffering a penalty.1 9 However, speech, and particularly "core speech" such as that concerning
political issues, is to be protected against infringement by legislatures
if at all possible-even if regulation of such speech is deemed to be
wise. 2 0 To this end, courts will apply the exacting scrutiny standard
when evaluating the constitutionality of legislation regulating political
speech. 21 The exacting scrutiny standard, as defined in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission, allows state restrictions on core speech only
when such restrictions are "narrowly tailored to serve an overriding
state interest." 22 The burden of this high standard evidences the deference given to political speech and assures that such speech will only
be subject to restriction when the state can provide a sufficiently compelling rationale.
It was under this exacting scrutiny test that the Supreme Court
evaluated the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that prohibited the
anonymous distribution of political pamphlets in McInytre. In finding
the statute to be an unconstitutional restriction on the First Amendment, the Supreme Court established a constitutional right to anony23
mous political speech.
This right was to be tested, however, by McConnell v. fEC,2 4 in
which the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of a provision of BCRA requiring individuals or organizations creating (or contributing to organizations which create) "electioneering
communications" to report their identification and other significant
information to the FEC. 25 Again, the Court applied the exacting scru18 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19 As Justice Holmes famously stated, "[t]he most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
20 Majors II, 361 F.3d at 356-57 (Easterbrook, J., dubitante) (citing multiple
sources).

21 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345-46 (1995) ("It is a regulation of pure speech. Moreover, even though this provision applies evenhandedly
to advocates of differing viewpoints, it is a direct regulation of the content of
speech.... Consequently... this case 'involves a limitation on political expression
subject to exacting scrutiny.'" (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988))).
22 Id. at 347.
23 See id. at 357.
24 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
25 Id. at 196.
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tiny standard and found the government's interests controlling and
26
the disclosure requirement constitutional.
In making this determination, the Court relied on the same state
interests as those presented in Buckley v. Valeo,27 the first Supreme
Court case to consider federal campaign disclosure requirements.
The Buckley Court acknowledged the importance of protecting the
electoral process from corruption (or the appearance thereof) and
allowed a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972
(FECA) that required candidates to report the identity of persons contributing money to a committee on behalf of a political candidate to
the FEC.28 FECA limited this requirement to candidate elections, and

not to "referenda or other issue-based ballot measures." 29 The distinction allowed disclosure requirements for political communications,
but limited them to those that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a particular candidate. 30 Thus, political communications involving "issue advocacy" were not within the confines of the FECA and
presumably not governed by Buckley's holding.
When the McIntyre Court then ruled on the constitutionality of
Ohio's statute banning all anonymous pamphleteering, it was able to
distinguish Buckley by showing that the Ohio statute covered issue advocacy as opposed to express advocacy 31 and was thus more intrusive
and "rest[ed] on different ...

32
less powerful state interests."

The Court again considered the issue of express advocacy versus
issue advocacy in McConnell, but now found that, despite its prior
precedents, there was no longer a distinction between the two types of
26
27
28

Id.
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
FECA required the reporting of
"the identification of each person to whom expenditures have been made by
such committee or on behalf of such committee or candidate within the
calendar year in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $100, the

amount, date, and purpose of each such expenditure and the name and
address of, and office sought by, each candidate on whose behalf such ex-

penditure was made."
Id. at 158 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (9) (Supp. 11 1973)).
29 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995).
30 Express advocacy is typically understood to mean the use of words or phrases
such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote
against," "defeat," or "reject." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
31 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356 ("The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, at issue
in Buckley, regulates only candidate elections, not referenda or other issue-based ballot measures.").

32

Id.
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3 3
Without this distinction, a large element of the
communications.
34
law used to distinguish McIntyre from Buckley is seemingly no longer
valid, leaving future courts without much guidance as to the legal difference between disclosure and disclaimer requirements. The McConnell opinion, at a length of over 200 pages, further compounded the
confusion by mentioning McIntyre only once (in a footnote, at that)
35
and failing to cite Tally v. California, Buckley v. American Constitu36
tional Law Foundation, or Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
37
Inc. v. Village of Stratton, cases that had been instrumental in the de38
As Judge Easterbrook
velopment of a right to anonymous speech.
laments in Majors II, such an opinion "makes it impossible for courts
at our level to make an informed decision-for the Supreme Court
39
As I will discuss in Part V,
has not told us what principle to apply."
the Court's failure to properly reconcile McIntyre and McConnell has
caused a split between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits and confusion
over which line of case law to apply.

II. A

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO
ANONYMOUS SPEECH

As Justice Thomas states in his concurring opinion in McIntyre,
"[t] here is little doubt that the Framers engaged in anonymous political writing. The essays in the Federalist Papers, published under the
pseudonym of 'Publius', are only the most famous example of the outpouring of anonymous political writing that occurred during the rati40
Anonymous discourse on political
fication of the Constitution."
in the nation's history, especially
place
matters has a long and storied
33

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193-94 (2003).
[The notion that] the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy . . . [also] cannot be squared
with our longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic
words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true
Buckley's express advocacy line . . . has not aided the legislative
issue ad ....
effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA
to correct the flaws it found ....

Id.
See supra note 31.
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
525 U.S. 182 (1999).
536 U.S. 150 (2002).
Majors II, 361 F.3d 349, 356 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).
Id. (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).
v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
McIntyre
40
concurring in the judgment).
34
35
36
37
38
39
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as practiced by the Framers. 4 1 In acknowledgement of this contribution to the founding of our nation, the Court has, over time, established a constitutional right to anonymously distribute political
literature.
This right was preceded by the establishment of a constitutional
right to anonymous association. In NAACP v. Alabama,42 the Supreme
Court struck down a civil contempt charge levied by the state of Alabama against the NAACP for failure to turn over membership rolls.
The right to associate anonymously, free of government interference,
was held to be a constitutional right protected by the First
43
Amendment.

Prior to NAACP, the Supreme Court decided Lovell v. City of Crif
In Lovell, the Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance that
banned the distribution of any literature in the city of Griffin, Georgia, without a permit. Citing the freedom of press provision of the
First Amendment, the Court held that "Liberty of the Press" was not
confined to newspapers and periodicals, but rather, extended to pam-

fin. 4 4

phlets and leaflets as well. 45 Noting the historical importance of anon-

ymous political contributions, the Court declared: "These indeed have
been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of
Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. '46 Although the Court did not go so far as to create a constitutional protection for anonymous pamphleteering, it nonetheless acknowledged the
historical contributions of such activity and set the stage for later
Courts that would directly address that issue.
The next case to consider restrictions on pamphleteering was
Talley v. California,47 in which the Supreme Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a Los Angeles city ordinance that prohibited the distribution, in any place and under any circumstances, of a
handbill which did not identify the name and address of the person or
persons (in the case of an organization or club) who created, printed,
or distributed such a handbill. 48 The Court, citing Lovell, again emphasized the important role played by anonymous pamphlets, leaflets,
brochures, and books in "the progress of mankind. ''4 9 While acknowl41
42

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
357 U.S. 449 (1958).

43

Id. at 466.

44
45
46
47
48
49

303 U.S. 444 (1938).
Id. at 452.
Id.
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 64.
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edging the state of California's interest in protecting its citizenry
against fraud, 5 0 the Court nonetheless felt that there were other, less
restrictive means by which the state could accomplish this goal without infringing on the "freedom to distribute information and thereby
freedom of expression

'5 1

and thus ruled the law unconstitutional.

Talley laid the groundwork for what would eventually be the Supreme Court's definitive take on the First Amendment's protection
for anonymous pamphleteering. In the seminal case of McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission,52 the Supreme Court ruled section
3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code unconstitutional as a violation of the
First Amendment. The Ohio statute in question prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature. The question thus
presented to the Court was whether such a statute was "'a law . . .
of speech' within the meaning of the First
abridging the 5 freedom
3
Amendment.
McIntyre raised a number of new legal issues concerning anonymous pamphleteering. First among these issues was "whether and to
what extent the First Amendment's protection of anonymity encom54
Afpasses documents intended to influence the electoral process."

ter cataloguing a long and storied history of anonymous political
discourse, 55 particularly amongst the Framers, the Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment did offer such protection. Despite the
apparent breadth of its decision, the Court's opinion did leave the
potential for legislatures to craft statutes that require identification
disclosure and yet remain within the confines of McIntyre's holding by
interest might justify a more limstating that, "a State's enforcement
56
ited identification requirement."
Justice Thomas offered a concurring opinion that emphasized
the importance of anonymous speech to our nation's history and
which argued for even greater anonymous protection than the majority's decision. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented,
with Justice Scalia recognizing the importance of anonymous political
speech among the Framers, but emphasizing the lack of a legislative
history in support of a constitutional right to such speech as being the
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
53 Id. at 336 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
54 Id. at 344.
55 Id. at 341-43.
56 Id. at 353 (emphasis added); see also id. at 358 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) ("We
do not therefore hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances require
the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity.").
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more controlling element. 57 In his dissent, Justice Scalia went on to
acknowledge the potential impact that the majority's ruling would
have on the forty-nine states with similar statutes, stating: "Perhaps,
then, not all the state statutes I have alluded to are invalid, but just
some of them; or indeed maybe all of them remain valid in 'larger
circumstances'!"5 8 In light of the new right to anonymous speech, the

Justice worried, "[i] t may take decades to work out the shape of this
newly expanded right-to-speak-incognito, even in the elections
field." 59 Indeed, Justice Scalia's concern has proven prescient, as
many of the election-related issues left unresolved in McIntyre continue to this day and particularly now in light of the Court's ruling in
McConnelL
III.

McIr.nyYi

AND THE CASE FOR A RIGHT TO

ANoNYMoUS PAMPHLETEERING

Margaret McIntyre was fined under an Ohio law for anonymously
distributing leaflets in opposition to a local school tax levy. Mrs. McIntyre brought a claim against the Ohio Elections Commission but
passed away prior to seeing its resolution. Litigation was continued by
her executor, Joseph McIntyre, who petitioned for and was granted a
writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court of the United States.
Plaintiff claimed that Ohio's ban on the distribution of anonymous
political literature was an unconstitutional infringement of her First
Amendment freedom of speech. Although the Court had previously
overturned statutes that banned the distribution of all literature or
that required identification of its source, 60 it had never before established a constitutional right to anonymously disseminate political
61
literature.
Because the Ohio statute restricted some elements of political
speech, it had the effect of burdening core speech and was thus subject to the exacting scrutiny standard. 62 In applying this standard, the
Court balanced the state's interest in preventing fraudulent and
libelous statements and its interest in providing the electorate with
57
58

See id. at 373-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 380-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

59

Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

60 See supra Part I.
61 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344 ("For that reason, Ohio correctly argues that Talley
does not necessarily control the disposition of this case. We must, therefore, decide
whether and to what extent the First Amendment's protection of anonymity encom-

passes documents intended to influence the electoral process.").
62

See supra note 21.
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63
relevant information against the law's burden on free speech. In a
7-2 decision, the Court held that Ohio's interests were not sufficiently
compelling to outweigh its burden on 64the First Amendment and
struck the law down as unconstitutional.
In defense of its statute, Ohio pointed to the Court's earlier decision in Buckley, which had allowed mandatory reporting requirements
for individual and organizational campaign-related expenditures.
The Court distinguished Buckley, stating, "the relevant portion of the
latter [Buckley] concerned mandatory disclosure of campaign-related
case involved a prohibition of anonymous camexpenditures. Neither
65
paign literature."

A.

Source Identification vs. Reporting Requirement

In distinguishing Buckley, the Court first noted that the Ohio statute's source identification requirement placed a far greater burden
on speech than did the reporting requirement at issue in Buckley. Secondly, the Court determined that Ohio's interests were far less compelling than those concerned in Buckley.
The Ohio statute required the individual or group responsible
for the advocacy material to identify itself as the source and mandated
that such identification "'appear[ ] on such form of publication in a
conspicuous place or is contained within said statement the name and
residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary
of the organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes,
or is responsible therefor.' "66
By requiring the creator of the material to identify itself on the
face of the material, the state was intruding on the speaker's freedom
of speech to a far greater extent than did the reporting requirement
of FECA. "[I] dentification of the author against her will is particularly
intrusive; it reveals unmistakably the content of her thoughts on a
controversial issue. Disclosure of an expenditure and its use, without
' 67 Moreover, because Buckley's remore, reveals far less information.
porting requirement involved the reporting of financial contributions,

63

McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348.

64 Id. at
speech than
65 Id. at
66 Id. at
67 Id. at

357 (noting that "our society accords greater weight to the value of free
to the dangers of its misuse").
353.
338 n.3 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988)).
355.
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it was a much less specific, personal, and provocative form of disclosure and much less conducive to retaliation against the identified. 68
The disparate impact on the author of on-its-face identification
versus after-the-fact reporting requirements would prove to be an area
of great confusion in Majors II, and criticism in Heller, and will form a
major basis for my analysis in Parts V and VI infra.
B.

Issue vs. Express Advocacy

The second point the Court used to distinguish McIntyre concerned the difference between "issue advocacy" and "express advocacy" as originally defined in FECA. As the Court states: "The Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, at issue in Buckley, regulates only candidate elections, not referenda or other issue-based ballot measures;
and we construed 'independent expenditures' to mean only those expenditures that 'expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate."' 69 Furthermore, in First NationalBank of Boston
70
v. Bellotti,

the Supreme Court expressly distinguished the threat of

corruption in candidate elections from that of referendum, stating
that such concerns were a compelling state interest in the former but
71
not the latter.
Under FECA, express advocacy was typically understood to mean
the use of words or phrases such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast
your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," or "re72

ject."

Any other expenditure was considered "issue advocacy" and

was not within the confines of FECA unless it was sufficiently related
to a particular campaign. 73
Mrs. McIntyre's leaflets proposed opposition to a school tax levy,
but not the election or defeat of a particular candidate. Her activity
was therefore best characterized as issue advocacy. Since Ohio Code
section 3599.09(A) governed the anonymous expression of both ex68 Id. ("[E]ven though money may 'talk,' its speech is less specific, less personal,
and less provocative than a handbill-and as a result, when money supports an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate retaliation.").
69 Id. at 356 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam)).
70 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
71 See id. at 790.
72 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976); see also FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d
857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987) (defining express advocacy as speech that "must, when read
as a whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no other
reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
candidate").
73 See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, The Elysian Fields of the Law, 57
STAN.

L. REV. 695, 700 (2004).
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press advocacy and issue advocacy, it effectively restricted her ability to
speak anonymously on the issue. As discussed earlier, FECA governed
only express advocacy. Moreover, its reporting requirements had the
effect of deterring quid pro quo corruptive electioneering activity by
exposing campaign expenditures to public scrutiny and FEC monitoring.74 No similar claim could be made regarding Ohio Code section
3599.09(A). As a result, section 3599.09(A)'s source identification requirements served to restrict a far wider range of75speech while providing for much less of a compelling state interest.
The distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy
continues to be a source of confusion for courts as they determine the
constitutionality of statutes limiting anonymous speech. The Supreme
Court's failure to address this distinction in McConnell with regard to
McIntyre has since lead to a great deal of confusion in the lower courts.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF CAMPAIGN REFORM ON
ANoNYMoUS PAMPHLETEERING

The emergence of campaign finance reform movements in the
early 1970s and again in the early 2000s led to a renewed call for accountability in the electoral process. In the interests of avoiding corruption (or the appearance of corruption) and providing for a more
fully informed electorate, both decades saw federal bills passed requiring greater disclosure in both fundraising and political advertising. In
ruling on the constitutionality of these statutes, the Supreme Court
has largely avoided the many issues presented by the apparent conflict
between a right to anonymous political advocacy and the need for
greater transparency in the electoral process. As a result, many lower
courts have struggled to interpret the constitutionality of state legislative experimentation, with understandable confusion and circuit splits
following. Any discussion of campaign finance reform must begin
with a discussion of the landmark case of Buckley v. Valet.
A.

Buckley v. Valeo

In the 1970s, the developing right to anonymous political speech
came into conflict with a movement towards greater accountability in
campaign finance. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 required, among other things, that political committees keep detailed
records of contributions and expenditures, including the name and
address of contributing individuals and groups, and file quarterly re74
75

McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356.
Id.
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ports with the FEC disclosing this information. 76 While the Court did
not directly address the implications of reporting requirements on
free speech, they acknowledged that such requirements "can seriously
infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment." 77 Mindful that the possibility of such encroachment
existed, the Court then applied an exacting scrutiny test to the statute. 78 Despite applying this strict standard, the Court held that the

government's interest in the reporting requirements outweighed the
possible infringement. In making this determination, the Court cited
three areas of government interest: (1) reporting helps people evaluate where money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate, (2)
it deters "actual corruption and avoid[s] the appearance of corruption,'79 and finally, (3) it acts as a necessary mechanism for assuring
that contribution limits were followed.8 0
The Buckley decision concerned the issue of a right to anonymous
association and made no mention of a constitutional right to anonymous speech. Although some state courts had found a First Amendment right to anonymous political speech,8 1 it was not until the
Supreme Court's decision in McIntyre that the issue of constitutional
protection for anonymous political speech was firmly decided. In
keeping with the Buckley Court, the Supreme Court again applied the
exacting scrutiny8 2 standard to the Ohio statute in question, but was
able to distinguish the facts from those in Buckley and thus achieve a
different result. Twenty-six years later the Court would again address
reporting and source identification issues in McConnell v. FEC,8 3 this
76 2 U.S.C. § 432 (Supp. 11 1973). At the time it was passed, the statute required
"political committees" to keep detailed records of contributions and
expenditures,
including the name and address of each individual contributing in excess of ten dol-

lars, and his occupation and principal place of business if his contribution exceeded
$100, and to file quarterly reports with the FEC disclosing the source of every contribution exceeding $100 and the recipient and purpose of every expenditure over
$100, and also required every individual or group, other than a candidate or political
committee, making contributions or expenditures exceeding $100 "other than by
contribution to a political committee or candidate" to file a statement with the Commission. See id.
77 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
78 Id. ("We long have recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a
mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest .... [T]he subordinating
interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny.").
79 Id. at 67.
80 Id. at 66-68.
81 See, e.g., People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996-97 (App. Div. 1974).
82 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
83 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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time presumably mindful of the post-McIntyre right to anonymous
speech.
B.

McConnell v. FEC

The Supreme Court next addressed campaign finance reform in
2003, when it evaluated the constitutionality of certain provisions of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.84 While the scope of

this case far exceeds the subject of this Note, an element of its findings has great implications in the area of anonymous political
literature.
McConnell was seemingly the perfect opportunity to tie together
the laws of anonymous pamphleteering and campaign finance and to
resolve the many vagaries that remained after Buckley and McIntyre.
The McConnell Court considered the constitutionality of a provision in
BCRA that required individuals to report their identity to the FEC if
they spent more than $10,000 to produce "electioneering communications" or gave $1000 or more to an organization that produced
them. 85 In keeping with its prior decision in Buckley, the Court found
this provision constitutional on the grounds that it served "important
state interests ...

[in] providing the electorate with information, de-

terring actual corruption and avoiding its appearance, and gathering
data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions." 86 Given the burden on anonymous political speech that such a
provision would place, it would seem logical that the Court would implicate McIntyre's holding in its evaluation. 8 7 However, very little attention was paid to McIntyre in the Court's analysis. McIntyre
warranted but a footnote in the opinion in which the Court stated:
"'[P] reservation of the individual citizen's confidence in government,'
we added, 'is equally important.' BCRA's fidelity to those imperatives
sets it apart from . . . the Ohio statute banning the distribution of

anonymous campaign literature, struck down in McIntyre."88
Justice Scalia's dissent was quick to point out the error in ignoring the overlap in these laws and the confusion it would likely create
for lower courts attempting to determine proper legal precedent for
84 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2
and 47 U.S.C.).
85 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 2002).
86 McConnel, 540 U.S. at 103.
87 See Majors II, 361 F.3d 349, 356 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).
88 McConnel 540 U.S. at 93 n.84; see also Majors II, 361 F.3d at 357 (Easterbrook,
J., dubitante) ("This footnote-the only place in which a majority opinion discusses
McIntyre (though not when dealing with § 304!)-says that 'BCRA's fidelity to those
imperatives' sets it apart from the law held invalid in McIntyre.").
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anonymous political issues. 89 The confusion caused by the Court's
failure to discuss McIntyre (or Talley, Watchtower, etc.) in McConnell has
become evident in the apparent circuit court split between Majors II
and ACLU v. Heller.90
V.

POST-MCCONNELL CIRCUIT SPLIT

After the Court's decision in McIntyre, a number of states sought
to tailor or amend existing electioneering legislation to bring it into
conformity with the Court's holding. Many states took notice of the
Court's distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy and
its emphasis on the need to protect spontaneous or individual pamphleteering in McIntyre. States like Indiana and Nevada then reworked legislation so as to bring it in line with the limited exception
hinted at in McIntyre.9 1
Since the McConnell Court handed down its decision in 2003, two
federal appeals courts have ruled on the constitutionality of state political disclosure statutes, with both reaching different results. In
ACLU v. Heller, the Ninth Circuit decided the constitutionality of Nevada Revised Statutes section 294A.320, which required "persons either paying for 'or responsible for paying for' the publication of 'any
material or information relating to an election, candidate or any question on a ballot' to identify their names and addresses on 'any [published] printed or written matter or any photograph.'"92 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that the Nevada statute was nearly identical to the
one overturned in McIntyre and, following the Supreme Court's precedent, held it to be unconstitutional. 93
As mentioned in the Introduction and Part I, Majors v. Abell concerned an Indiana statute that required a disclaimer be placed in a
conspicuous manner on political advertising expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a particular candidate so as to identify the person
or persons responsible for funding the advertising.9 4 After carefully
89 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
90
91

378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Majors v. Abell, 792 N.E.2d 22, 27 (Ind. 2003) ("Section 2.5 was added to

the Indiana Code in 1997 in response to McIntyre."); see also Heller, 378 F.3d at 982
("Nevada amended § 294A.320, originally enacted in 1989, in an effort to respond to
McIntyre.").
92 Heller, 378 F.3d at 981 (alteration in original) (quoting NEV. REv.
294A.320 (1997)).

93 Id. at 988.
94 Majors II, 361 F.3d 349, 350 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing IND.
2.5(b), (d) (Michie Supp. 2002)).
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considering Mclntyre's precedent and the possible First Amendment
implications of such a statute, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell and reluctantly held that the statute was constitutional.
Both decisions can be seen as being both consistent and at odds
with one another, depending on how one interprets the McConnell
decision. The Nevada statute at issue in Heller restricted both issue
advocacy and express advocacy, while the Indiana statute in Majors II
restricted its disclaimer requirement to express advocacy alone. Inasmuch as there remains a distinction between issue advocacy and express advocacy after McConnell, these decisions may be seen as being
consistent with one another. However, such an interpretation would
appear to fly in the face of the majority's opinion in McConnell, which
seems to explicitly disclaim any such legal difference. Without this
distinction, the holdings seem at odds with one another, as both states
seek to require a disclaimer containing the author's identity as an element of the political material, a requirement held unconstitutional in
McIntyre.
Hellerfollows McIntyre's analysis in finding Nevada's disclosure requirement a burden on free speech. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit
interpreted McConnell to mean that both disclosure and disclaimer requirements were now constitutional, regardless of whether the source
identification information was printed on the material or delivered ex
post in the form of a report to a central agency.
A.

Majors II

Recognizing the potential constitutional implications of such a
restriction on free speech, the Seventh Circuit first certified a question to the Indiana Supreme Court to determine the meaning of the
word "person" within the statute. A narrow interpretation, as advocated by the state, 95 would eliminate any further First Amendment
considerations, as it would be a "straightforward anti-fraud statute unlikely to present any serious constitutional problems." 9 6 After considering the state's interpretation, the Indiana Supreme Court returned
with a broad reading of the statute, taking the word "persons" to mean
all persons. 97 In light of this decision, the Majors 11 court would view
the statute with the exacting scrutiny standard and would view the statute with the deference traditionally afforded core speech.
95

The state of Indiana argued that interpretation of the word "person" should be

limited to candidates, campaign committees, and the committees' agents. Id.
96 Id.
97

Majors v. Abell, 792 N.E.2d 22, 30 (Ind. 2003).
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Also recognizing the potential implications of McConnell on its
decision, the Seventh Circuit waited until after the Supreme Court
had released that opinion and then gave the parties the opportunity
to submit memoranda discussing its implications. It then considered
Indiana section 3-9-3-2.5(b) relative to the analogous provision of
BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (3) (A) (i), which required the disclosure of
persons contributing threshold amounts to produce broadcast advertisements "within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary
that refer to a candidate for federal office." 9 8 Although the court acknowledged the distinction between disclosure, as required by BCRA,
and disclaimer, required in the Indiana statute, it took a practical view
of the distinction, noting that "the very thing that makes reporting less
inhibiting than notice in the ad itself-fewer people are likely to see
the report than the notice-makes reporting a less effective method
of conveying information that by hypothesis the voting public values." 99 By this logic, the court concluded that both sides of the First
Amendment would be depressed by a disclosure requirement-the
right to anonymous speech as well as the amount and quality of information available to the voting public.1 0 0
Finally, the Seventh Circuit expressed some reservation about its
inconsistent ruling relative to McIntyre's protection of anonymous
pamphleteering and noted that two recent cases had reached conflicting conclusions since McIntyre- Buckley v. American ConstitutionalLaw
Foundation01 a and FEC v. Public Citizen.l0 2 In Buckley v. American ConstitutionalLaw Foundation,the Supreme Court invalidated a state law that
required people circulating petitions for issue referenda to wear identification badges.' 0 3 However, in Public Citizen, the Eleventh Circuit
held constitutional a provision of the old finance reform act (FECA)
that required the identity of an advertiser to be disclosed in the adan assumption similar to that made in McConnell.10 4 Despite effusive
reservations about its decision, the Majors II court deferred to McConnell and found the Indiana statute constitutional.

98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Majors II, 361 F.3d at 352.
Id. at 353.
Id.
525 U.S. 182 (1999).
268 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2001).
Buckley, 525 U.S. at 204.
Public Citizen, 268 F.3d at 1291.
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B. ACLU v. Heller
In ACLU v. Heller,10 5 the Ninth Circuit considered the constitutionality of Nevada Revised Statute section 294A.320, which "requires
persons either paying for or 'responsible for paying for' the publication of 'any material or information relating to an election, candidate
or any question on a ballot' to identify their names and addresses on
'any [published] printed or written matter or any photograph."' 1 0 6
An exception was drawn for political candidates and parties that discussed only the candidate and displayed his or her name prominently. 10 7 Originally enacted in 1989, Nevada had amended section
294A.320 in a post-McIntyre effort to comply with its holding.
The petitioner, the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada,
brought a claim against the state, challenging the statute as being a
facially overbroad violation of the First Amendment. 0 8 Nevada argued for a narrow construction of the statute, interpreted to concern
only express advocacy, thus presumably bringing it outside of McIntyre's holding. 10 9 The Ninth Circuit rejected this narrowed construction 1 10 and noted the similarities between the Nevada statute and the
one held unconstitutional in McIntyre.'
As in Majors II, the Ninth
Circuit considered the implications of McConnell on the statute's disclosure requirements, but in a contrary opinion, distinguished the requirement on the grounds that it restricted the content of an election
communication. 1 2 As the court states, "nothing in McConnell undermines McIntyre's understanding that proscribing the content of an
election communication is a form of regulation of campaign activity
1 13
subject to traditional strict scrutiny."
The Ninth Circuit then considered section 294A.320 in light of
McIntyre, which it considered fully governing law. 114 Applying strict
scrutiny to the statute, the court weighed the statute's burden on free
speech against the state's interest in regulating campaign-related
speech. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that in some regards, Nevada's
statute was more intrusive than the statute overturned in McIntyre as it
restricted communications that related to any election, candidate, or
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 981 (alteration in original) (quoting NEV. REV.
Id.
Id. at 983.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 987.
Id.
Id.

114

Id. at 988.

STAT.

§ 294A.320 (1997)).
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ballot issue.' 1 5 After considering both the burdens on free speech
and the government's interest in such restrictions, the court held that
section 294A.320 failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard and was
16
thus facially unconstitutional.'
Heller was decided after Majors II, and the opinion makes specific
reference to that decision in light of the potential split. As mentioned
earlier, Heller's decision can be taken as being either consistent with
or at odds with Majors I depending on one's interpretation of the law
as it exists after McConnelL
If one acknowledges the existence of a legal distinction between
issue advocacy and express advocacy, the opinions are consistent with
one another, as Majors I!may be considered narrowly tailored to avoid
corruption in a candidate election. If, however, that distinction has
been removed by the Supreme Court, the rulings seem inconsistent
with one another. Both statutes require the person responsible for
the creation of political advertising to include a disclaimer on the face
of the material containing the identification information of the
source, a requirement specifically prohibited in McIntyre.
Heller acknowledges both possibilities, stating that "[e]lements of
Majors II may be inconsistent with our opinion."'117 In particular, the
Hellercourt takes issue with the Seventh Circuit's lack of consideration
for the disparate impact that disclosure and disclaimer requirements
have on freedom of speech. 118 Heller pointed to two ways in which the
Majors H decision had given insufficient consideration to First Amendment protection-namely, that Majors II failed to consider the conceptual difference between a regulation that alters communication
and one that does not, and secondly, that it did not recognize the
difference between a requirement that a speaker identify himself at
the time of the communication as opposed to reporting that informa119
tion at a different time.
VI.

POST-MCCONNELL

PAMPHLETEERING-WHAT

Now?

What Supreme Court case should determine the law going forward-McIntyre's right to anonymous political speech or McConnell's
deference to a reformed political process free of corruption and
source confusion? Disclaimer requirements, as prohibited in McIntyre,
create a unique burden on the advocate's right to free speech, in a
115
116

Id.at 986.
Id.at 1002.

117

Id. at 1001.

118

Id.at 1001-02.

119

Id.
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manner and degree far different than disclosures. Given the Court's
failure to discuss McIntyre in McConnell in any significant manner,
courts deciding the constitutionality of disclaimer requirements
should defer to McIntyre, which remains good law.
As the majority writes in McIntyre,
[u] nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy
and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the major-

ity. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of
the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals
ideas from suppression-at the hand of
from retaliation-and their
12 0
an intolerant society.
Disclaimer requirements increase the potential for immediate retaliation against the speaker. An unpopular speaker or one making
unpopular claims must fear not only "social ostracism, some dirty
looks, [or] a few snide comments, '"121 but the possibility of economic
122
or official retaliation as well as intrusions into her personal privacy.
Furthermore, requiring a writer to include her identification is not
only a government-imposed intrusion on the content of speech, but it
prevents the speaker from having her ideas stand alone, without regard to their source. 123 These two concerns-fear of retaliation and
what I will refer to as source bias-are consistently cited as the major
considerations present in protecting the right to anonymous political
speech.
In contrast, one must acknowledge the states' legitimate interest
in keeping the election process free of corruption and in maintaining
a fully informed electorate. As shown by the popularity and history of
1 24
campaign reform laws, many states have pursued this interest.
120 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (internal citation omitted).
121 Majors II, 361 F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2004).
122 Heller, 378 F.3d at 988.
123 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342-43.
[A]n advocate may believe her ideas will be more persuasive if her readers

are unaware of her identity. Anonymity thereby provides a way for a writer
who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge
her message simply because they do not like its proponent. Thus, even in
the field of political rhetoric, where 'the identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade,' City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512
U.S. 43, 56, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 2046, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (footnote omitted),
the most effective advocates have sometimes opted for anonymity.

Id.
124

Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court invalidates a species of

protection for the election process that exists, in a variety of forms, in every State
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Campaign reform statutes like BCRA illustrate the public's desire for
greater accountability and transparency in the campaign process.
Legislatures looking to provide the electorate with the origins of political communications should be afforded every constitutional opportunity to do so. However, the distinction between disclosure and
disclaimer, believed dead by the Majors I! court, affords the opportunity to honor both the First Amendment and the states' interests.
In McIntyre, the Supreme Court lays out the arguments in favor of
a First Amendment right to anonymous political speech. First, anonymity protects the speaker from retaliatory actions, social ostracism,
or intrusions into his or her private life. 125 Second, anonymity allows
the speaker to present his or her ideas independently from their
source, thus allowing the reader to evaluate the merits of the argu126
ment without bias.
The justifications for disclosure requirements usually center on
the state's desire to avoid quid pro quo corruptive practices; the state's
interest in avoiding fraud, libel, and in some circumstances, unattractive campaign practices such as mudslinging; and the importance of
providing the electorate with information regarding the source of political communications.
All of these interests can be accommodated by statutes that provide for disclosure while prohibiting the type of disclaimer requirements overturned in McIntyre and Heller.
A.

Justificationsfor First Amendment Protection of Anonymous Speech

Justice Thomas's concurring opinion displays the historical justification for a constitutional right to practice anonymous speech. 1 27 Although this right was not one specifically enumerated in the
Constitution or truly considered in the legislative history of its ratification, 12 8 the practice itself was popular among the Framers and its impact on the infant nation undeniable. The authors of the Federalist
Papers-Hamilton, Jay, and Madison-were particularly concerned
about both retaliation and source bias. Under the pseudonym Publius, they laid out their argument in favor of a strong central government in the Federalist Papers. Anonymity both protected these
Federalists from threats of violence and charges of treason, corrupexcept California, and that has a pedigree dating back to the end of the 19th
century").
125 Id. at 341-42.
126 Id. at 341.
127 Id. at 359-69 (ThomasJ., concurring).
128 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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tion, and sedition 129 and assured that readers would consider the validity of their arguments without suspicion of the specific motivations
of the authors. These rationales are no less compelling today and, in
the name of free speech, should be protected whenever possible.
1.

Retaliation

There are any number of reasons why a speaker may wish to remain anonymous. He or she may be motivated by fear of economic,
3
political, 130 or even physical retaliation.' ' The proponent of a controversial topic may wish to remain anonymous for fear of social ostra1 3 2 For
cism or simply out of a desire to retain some sense of privacy.
these reasons, labor laws prohibit employers from nosing out union
133 and our voting system asorganizers in order to prevent retaliation
sures that "everyone may vote in secret (our adoption of the Australian ballot came from awareness that disclosure could affect political
support) ."134

The requirement that one identify himself at the moment of the
communication opens up the possibility of "heat of the moment" retaliation.1 3 5 In contrast, requiring the speaker to identify himself either before or after the communication is less likely to result in
retaliatory action. 136 The circumstances surrounding Margaret McIntyre's advocacy, "an individual passing out leaflets in a school board
referendum, which might involve face-to-face contact in some circumstances-are significantly different from the circumstances to which
1 37 By requiring source identification
most disclosure statutes apply."'
to be included with the material, state statutes like Indiana Code section 3-9-3-2.5 have increased the possibility of immediate harassment
or, worse, physical retaliation.
129
130

See Turley, supra note 13, at 58-59.
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341.

134

Id. (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).

131 See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 198 (1999)
(describing how those wearing mandatory identification badges feared physical retaliation when circulating controversial petitions).
132 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
133 Majors II, 361 F.3d 349, 356 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).
135 See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 199.
136 Id. (noting that identification (in this circumstance an affidavit) was not immediately available to the reader and thus less likely to be used for retaliation against the
speaker).
137 ELIZABETH GARRETT & DANIEL A. SMITH, VEILED POLITICAL ACTORS: REAL
THREAT TO CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE STATUTES 14 (USC-Caltech Center for the Study of
Law and Politics, Working Paper No. 13, 2004), available at http://lawweb.usc.edu/
cslp/papers/GarrettSmithVPA1 2.pdf.
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Disclaimer laws may also have the effect of increasing the likelihood of political retaliation against grassroots advocates. As Majors II
notes, "[s] everal cases, signally McIntyre itself, expressly or implicitly
contrast the fragility of the small, independent participant in political
campaigns with large corporations or other organizations."13 8 To the
extent that we continue to value the protection of small, independent
participants against retaliation, we should continue to recognize the
disparate impact of disclaimer laws on such individuals.
Throughout history, those in power have attempted to learn the
identity of their political opponents in the hopes of using that power
to silence opposition. In 1779, the Continental Congress attempted
to discover the identity of "Leonidas," an anonymous writer who had
criticized the Congress for "causing inflation throughout the States
and for engaging in embezzlement and fraud.'1 3

9

Justice Thomas's

concurring opinion in McIntyre recounts numerous examples of early
government actions taken to discover the identity of anonymous writers in an attempt to silence political dissent.' 40 As the facts of McIntyre
show, individuals are particularly vulnerable to such attacks. Bradley
A. Smith writes that "Margaret McIntyre had been opposing a local
school millage: school board officials filed the complaint against her
after the election, which suggests their primary aim was retaliation." 14 '
Disclaimer requirements have a different impact on the free speech of
grassroots, individual advocates than do disclosure laws because they
allow far more of such advocacy to be regulated.
BCRA requires that an individual spend or contribute a minimum threshold amount towards an "electioneering communication"
before having to report his or her identity to the FEC,142 thus lessening the reporting burden on smaller, individual efforts, as well as the
administrative burden on the FEC itself. In contrast, the disclaimer
statute in Majors II required action only by the advocate and not by
the government, 1 43 thus lessening the bureaucratic burden required
of both the government and the speaker. By decreasing the overall
138 Majors II, 361 F.3d at 355 (citing multiple sources).
139 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Leonidas was actually Dr. Benjamin Rush. Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
140 Id. at 360-67 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
141

BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

222 (2001).
142 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 2002).
143 Section 3-9-3-2.5 of the Indiana Code requires the speaker to identify him or
herself in a clear and conspicuous manner within the material being distributed, but
requires no further action either in concert with or on behalf of the government.
IND. CODE ANN. § 3-9-3-2.5 (Michie Supp. 2002).
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burden on both parties, the statute was able to incorporate much
smaller advocacy efforts within its scope.
Although the Indiana statute contained a narrow exception for
144
such an exindividuals distributing 100 pieces of material or less,
in BCRA
set
threshold
$1000
minimum
the
from
ception is a far cry
advoindependent
of
and therefore implicates a far greater amount
identify
to
cacy. By requiring independent and individual advocates
themselves, disclaimer statutes increase the potential for political or
governmental retaliation against such speakers. This is particularly
disturbing because it increases the possibility of retaliation against
those who can least afford to defend themselves and are least likely to
have corruptive influence.
2.

Source Bias

The second justification for anonymous speech protection is the
danger of source bias. As stated in McIntyre,
[o] n occasion, quite apart from any threat of persecution, an advocate may believe her ideas will be more persuasive if her readers are
unaware of her identity. Anonymity thereby provides a way for a
writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will
her message simply because they do not like its
not prejudge
1 45
proponent.
One of the reasons the authors of the Federalist Papers wrote
under the name Publius was to assure that the reader would evaluate
146
Thus, James
their arguments without consideration of the source.
Northerners
that
assured
be
could
Publius,
as
writing
when
Madison,
he was
because
simply
them
discount
not
reading his ideas would
147
from Virginia.
As Aristotle once wrote,
persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the
speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe
good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true gen144 Id. § 3-9-3-2.5(a) (9).
145 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
146 See SMITH, supra note 141, at 224 ("One reason that the Federalist Paperswere
published anonymously was to force readers to focus on the arguments therein,
rather than on attacking the writers.").
147 Majors II, 361 F.3d 349, 357 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante) ("Instead of having to persuade New Yorkers that his roots in Virginia should be overlooked, Madison could present the arguments and let the reader evaluate them on

merit.").

1954

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 80:5

erally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. 148
And so while it is true that we may trust a speech more readily
when we know and respect its source, the corollary is also true. When
we know the source and, for whatever reason, discount its character,
we attribute our own biases and preconceived notions to its message
regardless of merit. A student note, for example, carries less authoritative weight than an article by an esteemed law professor; yet the merits of the argument may still be worthy of our attention-after all, the
law students of today are the professors of tomorrow.
In our modern political environment, information sources must
compete with hundreds of other voices, alljockeying for precious time
and attention. 14 9 Judgments about sources are hastily made and agendas are quickly suspected. Even our most venerated journalistic
sources are accused of slanting the news to further their own agendas1 50 and sometimes admit as much. 15 1
In a similar sense, a pamphlet from the ACLU may be assumed by
the reader to espouse a liberal viewpoint, while that very same pamphlet with a different organization's name attached (or no name at
all) could be interpreted as being conservative. A speaker wishing to
convince his target of his point might then do well to mask his or her
identity so as to force the reader to focus on the relative worth of the
message alone. In this context, disclaimer requirements form an undue burden on the speaker's First Amendment rights because they
intrinsically link the speaker to the message, lessening the chances
that some information may be read or properly considered. Disclosure requirements, in contrast, allow the speaker to be separated from
the speech to allow the merits of the argument to stand on their own.

148 ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2152, 2155 (J.
Barnes ed., 1984).
149 In the 2004 presidential election, over $334 million was spent on political television advertising from April 1-September 31, with over 400,000 individual advertisement airings. TNS Media Intelligence, Findings Memo: Election '04: Issues in Political
Advertising (2004), available at http://206.103.228.140/publications/1004_election-findings.pdf; see also Nick Anderson, TV Ad Spending Soars as Messages Turn Shrill,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at A14 (reporting that presidential television advertising
spending had approached $500 million and broken all previous spending records).
150 See generally BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAs: A CBS INSIDER EXPOSES HOW THE MEDIA
DISTORT THE NEWS (2001) (noting the pervasiveness of bias in the mainstream
media).
151 See Daniel Okrent, Editorial, Is the New York Times a LiberalPaper?,N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 2004, § 4, at 2.
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States' Interests in Reporting Requirements

Fully Informed Electorate

One justification for disclaimer requirements are that they provide the electorate with information about the source of the communication, thus allowing the reader to better evaluate the credibility of
the source. This justification was provided by both Nevada and Indi15
ana in Heller 152 and Majors II, 3 respectively, in defense of their disclaimer provisions. However, as McIntyre states,
[t] he simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make
statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit. Moreover, in
the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known
to the recipient, the name and address of the author add little, if
anything, to the reader's ability to evaluate the document's message.
to support
Thus, Ohio's informational interest is plainly insufficient
15 4
requirement.
disclosure
its
of
the constitutionality
While identification of the author of political advocacy may provide the reader with greater reason to believe or disbelieve her message, there is no reason why the state should mandate the inclusion of
such information. Readers understand that anonymous advocacy may
have dubious origins and will accord it an appropriate level of skepticism. To hold otherwise is to discredit the ability of the average citiwhat role that
zen to evaluate anonymous literature and to determine
1 55
information.
the
of
credibility
the
in
anonymity plays
Furthermore, although arguments are made that disclaimers increase the information available to the voting public, the exact opposite may be true. Requiring a speaker to reveal his or her identity will,
in some cases, discourage the voices of those who would speak their
minds but for the requirement. Because of the potential for social
ostracism, harassment, or retaliation that identification disclaimers
pose, many potential speakers may be dissuaded from speaking their
152
153
154
155

ACLU v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2004).
361 F.3d 349, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2004).
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-49 (1995).
New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (App. Div. 1974).
Don't underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough to

evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous.
They know it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its
message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that message.
And then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide what is 'responsible', what is valuable, and what is truth.
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minds. By discouraging these voices, the state is therefore lessening
the dialogue available to the prospective voter, and in such a circumstance, providing the electorate with less information with which to
form its political opinions. 15 6
2.

Preventing Corruption (or the Appearance Thereof)

The electoral process is a sacred institution and one certainly
worth protecting from improper influence. Source identification
serves two purposes: it assures that a statement will not be falsely attributed to the candidate (which I will call ventriloquism) and prevents quid pro quo corruption.
a.

Ventriloquism

In the most recent presidential campaign, a group calling itself
the Swift Vets and POWs for Truth ran television ads seeking to discredit many of candidate John Kerry's claims regarding his service in
Vietnam. The Swift Vet group was quickly attacked by Senator Kerry's
staff as working illegally with the Bush Administration, in violation of
FEC laws. Indeed, even when the identification of a speaker is known
and the funding made public, there still may be accusations of wrongdoing and the belief that, in fact, the candidate himself is behind the
speech. Anonymity, it is argued, increases the likelihood that the audience will mistakenly attribute the words of the anonymous speaker
to a particular candidate. 15 7 Given the number of restrictions and disclaimers candidates must themselves place on advertising and campaign literature, it seems again odd that literature that is without such
information would be mistakenly attributed to the candidate. Furthermore, in the same sense that we must trust the electorate in determining the credibility of anonymous sources, we should trust them at
least enough to be able to determine what is and what is not sponsored by a particular candidate.
b.

Quid Pro Quo Corruption

"The Supreme Court tells us that the purpose of [disclosure] is to
'deter actual corruption' and 'detect any postelection special favors.'" 15 8 As Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Buckley states: "I ...
agree fully with the broad proposition that public disclosure of contributions by individuals and by entities-particularly corporations and
156
157

Majors II, 361 F.3d at 353.
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 383-84.
158 SMITH, supra note 141, at 223.
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labor unions-is an effective means of revealing the type of political
support that is sometimes coupled with expectations of special favors
' 159

or rewards."

Assuming that the state does have a legitimate interest in identifying the source of funding for advocacy for the purposes deterring corruption, how does a disclaimer provide any more protection to the
public than a disclosure? If anything, a disclaimer provides less information, as disclosure of identification to a public agency provides that
agency with the ability to aggregate the amount and frequency of
funding (or ads, communications, etc.). 160 "[D]isclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of
publicity." 16 1 Furthermore, disclosure provides "an essential means of
gathering the data necessary to detect the violations of the contribu1' 62
tion limitations.
In contrast, a flyer with the name and address of the person funding a pamphlet effort does little to inform the general public of potential corruptive elements in their midst. We do not know if that flyer is
one of 100 or 100,000. Further, disclaimers do not tell us if this batch
of pamphlets is the first of the campaign or the fiftieth. Because disclaimers do not provide any information regarding the scope or size
of the electioneering effort, they provide little in the way of information to the general public or to government agencies that would deter
or help investigate potential corruptive activities.
3.

Prevention of Fraud and Mudslinging

As Justice Scalia points out in his dissent, anonymity may increase
the frequency of impropriety in the campaign process.1 63 By allowing
the author to withhold his identity, and thus remain unaccountable
for his statement, there may be an increase in the frequency of fraud,
libel, and "character assassination." 164 Justice Scalia states:
It is not unheard-of for campaign operatives to circulate material
over the name of their opponents or their opponents' supporters (a
violation of election laws) in order to attract or alienate certain in159 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 236 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
160 "Curriers of favor will be deterred by the knowledge that all expenditures will
be scrutinized by the Federal Election Commission and by the public for just this sort
of abuse." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356.
161 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
162 Id. at 68.
163 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 382 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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terest groups ....
How much easier-and sanction free!-it would
be to circulate anonymous material (for example, a really tasteless,
though not actionably false, attack upon one's own candidate) with
the hope and expectation that it will be attributed to, and held
against, the other side.1 6 5
What Justice Scalia fails to distinguish, however, is how mudslinging anonymously is any different from doing so vaguely or perhaps
mysteriously. If a group deciding to call itself the Action Committee
for the Liberal Party is really a group of Republicans, 166 how is the
situation any worse if the material contains no identification at all? If
nothing else, people will see that the material is anonymous and will
be even more skeptical of its source. 167 Granted, an individual advocate might be less willing to distribute false information if he was required to include his real name on the face of the material. However,
it also stands to reason that one willing to fraudulently distribute false
or libelous information is unlikely to comply with such a requirement
to begin with. Moreover, pseudonyms or materially false identifiers
could be used in place of the author's real name, leading to perhaps
greater confusion among the electorate. Readers of anonymous material are at least put on guard as a result of the source's anonymitynot so for material which contains a disclaimer, but one which is
fraudulently or even vaguely created. In such a circumstance, a
reader is lulled into a false sense of security in the mistaken belief that
the source is who they say they are.
CONCLUSION

The difference between disclaimer requirements and disclosure
requirements should not be overlooked. Disclaimer requirements are
a far greater intrusion on free speech than disclosure requirements,
while offering less benefit to the states' interests. By pointing out
these differences, however, I do not mean to suggest that all political
advocacy should then be subject to disclosure laws. Such a finding
would eliminate all anonymous political speech and completely disregard McIntyre's holding. Moreover, requiring everyone who wished to
practice political advocacy to report his or her identity to a centralized
agency is impractical and unfair. If taken to its logical conclusion,
such a requirement would either create an enormous bureaucracy
having to accommodate every single leaflet campaign or would restrict
165 Id. at 383 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
167 See New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (App. Div. 1974); supra text
accompanying note 148.
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all political speech to only the largest and most sophisticated
campaigns.
Rather, the type of spontaneous, grassroots political activity practiced by Mrs. McIntyre is at the heart of our free speech protections
and should be defended whenever possible.' 68 What I mean to suggest is that when the states do enact laws requiring the identification
of speakers, they should be mindful of the disparate impact on free
speech that disclaimer requirements create and should choose disclosure whenever feasible.
With all due respect to the Ninth Circuit, I am not sure that the
Supreme Court has crossed any "Rubicon" in McConnell concerning
disclosure versus disclaimer. As the confusion in Majors II shows, the
Court should clarify the state of express versus issue advocacy postMcConnell and to what extent McIntyre remains good law. Until that
day, McIntyre's prohibition on issue advocacy disclaimer requirements
is and should remain good law.
As the Heller court points out, McIntyre has not been overturned
and remains good law169 -at least for now. However, the Supreme
Court's failure to discuss McIntyre in McConnell leaves some uncertainty as to the future of anonymous pamphleteering. What remains
most uncertain after McConnell is the state of express advocacy versus
issue advocacy, or better stated, whether there remains any such distinction. To the extent that there remains a difference between the
two, McIntyre's prohibition on disclaimer requirements should be
given its proper weight as precedent over all issue advocacy
communications.
Disclaimer requirements are particularly intrusive because they
are a proscription on speech itself, unless the speech conforms to governmental regulations. 1 70 Disclaimer requirements also have the effect of deterring some speakers from participating in advocacy for fear
of immediate retaliation. Disclaimer laws are presumably popular
with state legislatures because they are relatively burden free; they require government effort and spending only to the degree necessary
for enforcement. Disclosure laws are presumably less popular with
legislatures because they require state bureaucratic efforts and funding to execute. However, protecting the First Amendment is not a
matter of pragmatism.17 1 When less intrusive means are available, the
168 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (characterizing Mrs. McIntyre's political speech as
"the essence of First Amendment expression").
169 ACLU v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 987-98 (9th Cir. 2004).
170 See id. at 987.
171 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam).
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state should defer to free speech and pursue those avenues whenever
possible.

